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§1| Introduction 
 
Sartre’s account of freedom is still widely understood as a version of metaphysical 
libertarianism, a doctrine which asserts that the human being is completely and unconditionally 
free.  This prevalent reading is largely due to the influence still held by Mary Warnock’s 
interpretation of his early texts and her privilege of the role of anguish in his thought.1  The true 
doctrine of Sartrean philosophy is, according to this position, the idea that man is absolutely and 
unconditionally free and that determinism is false.  This leads to a tension in Being and Nothingness 
between, on the one hand, the self as an uncaused and ultimately meaningless spontaneity; and, on 
the other, an account of human nature as the original project.  Warnock accuses Sartre of resolving 
this tension in his later works by betraying freedom and re-introducing determinism into his account 
of human nature, namely Marxist historical materialism.  Her book makes it possible to speak of an 
early and a late Sartre; the existentialist, and the Marxist. 
 
However, this approach over-determines the meaning of freedom in Sartre’s texts as 
uncaused spontaneity when it is possible to offer an alternative interpretation by returning to the 
anachronistic idea of human nature.  Sartre openly states that ‘there is no human nature’ (EH 29), 
but this is to be understood in terms of his whole presentation of human freedom and not just in 
relation to his rejection of determinism.2  The aim of this paper is not to deny the libertarianism 
inherent in Sartre’s account, but to argue that it is but the most basic level on which a more 
sophisticated account of free-will is erected.  An examination of the influence of the German 
idealist tradition and, especially, Heidegger on Sartre’s ideas, will hopefully demonstrate the 
importance of the notion of freedom as self-determination. 
§2| Sartre’s libertarianism 
 
Most interpretations of Sartre’s work begin from his contribution to the freedom-
determinism debate: of the three characters in the debate – that is, the determinist, the compatibilist 
  
and the libertarian – Sartre offers his readers the most extreme and consistent account of the 
libertarian position.  The determinist holds that the human being is a physical object like all others, 
subject to the physical laws of the universe and, once all the laws are known and the initial 
conditions revealed, the human being is as predictable in his or her behaviour as a billiard ball.  
Free-will is merely an illusion.  The compatibilist agrees that man is subject to causal law since he 
is motivated by desires, but that freedom is the power to satisfy desire and so one ought to 
understand freedom as freedom from restraint.  For the libertarian, the human being is free because 
he can choose his own values and projects.  Human beings and objects are just different types of 
things; humans are able to determine their own actions through an act of volition which is 
uncaused.3  Sartre is the proper name most commonly associated with the position of the libertarian 
as he rejects any deterministic theory of action and, equally, he does not accept compatibilism: if 
freedom means uncaused, to describe freedom as acting on one’s desires without impediment is to 
say one’s action is caused by a desire or a personality trait. (BN 433-442)  To be free is to reject all 
possible explanations of knowing, doing or being which refer to something prior and external to 
consciousness. 
 
The above account of freedom can be found most clearly in The Transcendence of the Ego 
and, at that stage, Sartre was concerned with capturing, not defining, the nature of metaphysical 
freedom, that is the essence of consciousness.  It is in Being and Nothingness that the moral 
consequences of his extreme libertarianism begin to be felt with regard to responsibility.  In asking 
for what things am I responsible, the agent asks himself of all the events in the world which can I 
claim as ‘mine.’  A very unsophisticated determinist would answer absolutely nothing: the agent is 
nothing more than a complicated billiard ball.  The compatibilist would answer: all those acts which 
are motivated by my own desires.  Both accounts, of course, have their problems: the former 
because it seems to negate far too much of our actual experience, the latter because it cannot explain 
why we conceive of coercion as a case of unfree action. 
  
 
Sartre, though, would respond by saying that the agent is responsible for every act (and one 
must remember that knowing, too, is a species of acting for Sartre).  One cannot claim that ‘I 
couldn’t help it’, ‘That’s just the way I am’ or ‘It’s my duty’ in order to negate one’s personal 
responsibility for what one has done.  Any attempt to avoid responsibility, to deny one’s freedom, is 
bad faith and this is the morality that lies at the heart of Being and Nothingness.  Bad faith is a 
denial of freedom, a denial of who we are, it is to deny the very dignity of humanity.  The 
realisation that the agent is solely responsible for his acts leads to anguish, the dread of being free, 
and it is this revelation which Warnock takes to be so significant in Sartre’s work.  Anguish 
captures the nature of the human being condemned to be free, knowing that he must decide and 
choose and that these choices are his and his alone. 
 
Yet, it is this extreme libertarianism which gives rise to the paradox of freedom.  
Responsibility was defined as those events which originate from ‘me’ and a compatibilist is able to 
describe an empirical self, a personality or storehouse of desires, and restructure the object ‘me’ 
which is in the world.  The libertarian, of course, rejects any causal relationship between an 
empirical self and action.  When the libertarian says that ‘I chose to x’ what is the object which can 
stand in for the ‘I’?   
 
One could, perhaps, follow the libertarianism of Kant and equate the unity of ‘I’ with the 
rational self as opposed to the phenomenal self: the agent is responsible when he acts from reasons 
rather than when he is motivated by empirical causes such as desires.4  However, the extreme nature 
of Sartre’s libertarianism can be heard in these words: ‘… the root of all Reason is to be sought in 
the depths of the free act.’ (CF 183; see also BN 570) Kant, after all, talks of two different orders of 
causality, one of reason and one of the phenomenal world.  If one were capable of understanding 
the principles of reason, then the right action could be predicted.  This is to replace the free agent 
  
with reason and it is not the agent who chooses but reason itself.  For Sartre, this is akin to positing 
a law of consciousness which is absurd.  A law of consciousness would be known by a 
consciousness and, if it is known by a consciousness, then that consciousness is prior to it. (BN 
xxvi-xxxii) 
 
Sartre, then, absolutely rejects all forms of causality, including the differentiation of the self 
into rational and phenomenal, à la Kant.  It is the spontaneous nature of consciousness which makes 
room for a coherent notion of choice: for a choice to be mine and mine alone, it must not arise from 
a prior character, from a given desire, form the way the world is or was, or, finally, from the dictates 
of reason.  For a choice to be authentic and free the agent must negate these constraints and 
consciousness has to be spontaneous.  And here is the problem: if the choice is spontaneous, is it 
not better understood as an event since the ‘I’ which chooses is nothingness and not identical with 
the empirical ego which is ‘me’?  What is the difference between this uncaused event and choosing 
an ice-cream by lottery, that is placing my hand in a bucket of tickets with flavours written on them 
and picking one?5  Perhaps one can say in an absurd universe, there is no difference, but then Sartre 
has to explain the phenomenon of anguish differently, for if the ‘me’ of ‘my’ choice is nothingness, 
then who is responsible and who feels anguish?  Who is the self which connects all the acts as 
mine?  Freedom understood in this manner seems to lose its relationship to responsibility which is 
crucial for the experience of anguish. 
 
Being and Nothingness is Sartre’s attempt to offer a resolution to this problem because the 
subject is no longer a metaphysical abstraction employed to reveal the structures of being human (as 
it was in the earlier works), but it is characterised as a particular person living in the world. (BN 3)  
And what defines a person as opposed to an isolated consciousness is simply continuity over time: 
this series of acts is ‘me.’  Thus, Being and Nothingness, in its introduction and first two parts, 
revises and elaborates the account of metaphysical freedom Sartre had already described in the 
  
earlier works.  In parts three and four, he begins to offer an answer to the problem of continuity: the 
original project is a universal, fundamental structure of being human.  The original project dictates 
that each act has a meaning in relation to a consciousness which is constructing itself in the face of 
other consciousnesses (being-for-others). 
 
Warnock describes the original project as man’s desire to possess others and the world, but 
these are only manifestations of a deeper structure.  Why is it that consciousness seeks to possess 
other consciousnesses and the world?  In order to be something and not nothing; in order to be 
fixed, essential and free of anguish; in order to be what it is not.  Sartre’s own description bears this 
out: 
The goal in short is to overtake that being which flees itself while being what it is in the 
mode of not-being and which flows on while being its own flow, which escapes 
between its own fingers; the goal is to make of it a given, a given which finally is what 
it is; the problem is to gather together in a unity of one this unachieved totality which is 
unachieved only because it is to itself its own non-achievement, to escape from the 
sphere of perpetual reference which has to be a reference to itself, and – precisely 
because it has escaped from the chains of this reference to itself – to make it be as a seen 
reference – that is, a reference which is what it is. (BN 153) 
Continuity or personality is postulated in an account of human nature which Sartre believes is 
consistent with his description of consciousness: to found oneself as that being which is 
recognisably free through a series of acts that demonstrate this undeniably to the other.  The 
metaphysical freedom of The Transcendence of the Ego becomes a practical freedom of the person 
in situation: 
Human reality can not receive its ends, as we have seen, either from outside or from so-
called inner ‘nature’.  It chooses them and by this very choice confers upon them a 
transcendent existence as the external limits of its projects.  From this point of view – 
  
and if it is understood that the existence of Dasein precedes and commands its essence – 
human reality in and through its very upsurge decides to define its own being by its 
ends.  It is therefore the positing of my ultimate ends which characterizes my being and 
which is identical with the sudden thrust of freedom which is mine. (BN 443)6 
 
It is at this point in the description of being human that Warnock poses her famous challenge: 
Sartre has created an unacceptable tension between, on the one hand, freedom as uncaused 
spontaneity and, on the other, a universal account of human nature.  No matter how thin this general 
theory of man is, according to her, Sartre is guilty of reintroducing an essence into man’s being and 
contradicting his own condition of freedom: 
What can be meant by saying that we choose ourselves, or that we choose how to live in 
our peculiar circumstances and situation, if we are committed, by being human, to a 
general pattern of behaviour such as Sartre has described?  Sartre accuses Freud of 
denying human freedom by basing his method of analysis of human behaviour on the 
supposition that we are determined by our past experiences to behave as we do.  But his 
method of analysis, in so far as it has any definite basis at all, must rest on the equally 
deterministic assumption that we form the projects we do because of our commitment to 
possess others and the world. (PS 126) 
And how was this tension to be resolved?  The standard interpretation states that Sartre negated the 
freedom of the particular individual for his account of human nature which was to eventually 
embody Marxist doctrine.  Sartre betrayed his existentialist roots in order to make his account 
consistent: there is an early Sartre – the existentialist and the exponent of an extreme (if 
contradictory) libertarianism – and a late Sartre who reveals the problems with that position and 
opts for Marxism instead. 
§3| The alternative reading: a Heideggerean Sartre 
 
  
It is possible to offer an alternative, equally plausible interpretation of Sartrean freedom 
which retains the concept’s centrality  in his work, but also proposes a continuity between the 
psychological and sociological levels of meaning.  The established schism in Sartre’s thought is 
most comprehensively championed in Warnock’s book and a couple of general statements made 
there are extremely revealing.  First, for all her continued references to Sartre’s anti-Cartesianism, 
her book often works against this overall interpretation, relying too heavily on a parallel between 
the two thinkers: ‘Sartre, like all French philosophers, treats Descartes as the father of the subject, 
and ‘Cogito ergo sum’, Descartes’ supposedly indubitable foundation for his whole system, as 
somehow containing the germ of all truth within itself.’ (PS 13) This is true, but, for Sartre, ‘Cogito 
ergo sum’ is understood as ‘We must begin from the subjective.’ (EH 26)  It is only to assert that 
the explanation of any phenomenon must include and be grounded in the consciousness of that 
phenomenon.  For there to be phenomena, one must be experiencing and if one is experiencing, one 
exists.  This is a familiar transcendental argument that, for Sartre, proves that if there is 
consciousness, then there must exist a pre-reflective cogito, which is consciousness of being 
conscious of x.  This falls far short of Descartes’ mind or thinking substance and, yet, Warnock 
manages to mistakenly allows a latent dualism to corrupt her presentation of Sartre’s theory of 
mind: ‘The duality of mind and body, of physical thing and mental thing, is essential to human 
beings and determines their behaviour in many ways.  For other people I am, at first and 
immediately, a Being-in-itself.  For myself I am, naturally, a Being-for-itself.  And together these 
two modes of being combine to define the third mode – Being-for-others.’ (PS 66-7)  This 
quotation contains obvious errors: one, it is not clear that first and immediately I am a being-in-
itself for others.  Others are immediately and pre-reflectively different from being-in-itself for 
Sartre.  More significantly, there is no dualism in Sartre’s thought between thinking substance and 
physical substance.  There is only Being and consciousness and the two do not form a duality 
because consciousness is nothingness.  It is a strange duality indeed which holds that there are two 
types of things in the world, one which is being and the other which is nothing.  Also, if the dualism 
  
is constituted by being-for-itself and being-in-itself, how then is one supposed to comprehend the 
third mode: being-for-others?  Warnock does not explicitly call Sartre a dualist, but the implication 
is latent in her interpretation.  Unfortunately, the interpretation became standard and being-for-itself 
and being-in-itself were conveniently mapped on to mind and body. 
 
Any alternative reading of Sartre’s account of subjectivity has to return to the relationship 
between these concepts and their anti-Cartesian origin.  A parenthetical comment by Warnock 
reveals why her reading may be inadequate: 
(I shall not, incidentally, say anything at all about the origins of these expressions or 
their history in Hegelian and German idealist philosophy in general.  Sartre owes a very 
great deal to Hegel, and also to Heidegger.  But these philosophers are themselves so 
exceedingly obscure that more would be lost than gained in trying to trace the debts and 
the corruptions, the likenesses and the differences, which are, however, certainly there 
to be traced by anyone who has the patience to undertake it.) (PS 42)7 
Warnock’s mistake resides in refusing to think through these connections since it is easy to frame 
Sartre as a dualist if one thinks of these concepts as entities rather than as modes of being.  
Consciousness comports itself – that is, behaves – towards being and this is crucial to understanding 
his anti-Cartesianism which – in Being and Nothingness – is derived largely from Heidegger.  More 
significantly, Sartre’s anti-Cartesianism explains why he assumes that he can offer an account of 
freedom which is compatible with a universal structure of human being. 
 
The first departure for an existentialism is to hold existence precedes essence: any 
knowledge at all (any relationship with being) is only possible if there is a subject.  This is a 
familiar transcendental argument which one finds in Kant: the unity of apperception is proven by 
the fact that moments of consciousness must have an a priori unity otherwise synthesis would not 
be possible.8  It is in Heidegger’s thought that the unity of apperception, which for Kant is derived 
  
from knowledge, becomes ontologically prior.9  If there exists an a priori unity, surely the way in 
which this exists determines the objects of experience and any ontology or metaphysics must begin 
with this: each different entity has a different way of being known, it is characterised differently due 
to the subject’s behaviour towards it.  Although I say ‘I know myself’, ‘I know Paul’ and ‘I know 
that is a table’ with the same verb, what I am doing – and knowing is a type of doing – is different 
in each case.  The modes of being Sartre describes are derived from this approach. 
 
Dasein – Heidegger’s substitution for the Cartesian Cogito and the Kantian unity of 
apperception – is constituted by three knowing relationships.  (1) Dasein is concerned about things, 
they matter because they can either fulfil or frustrate its projects or desires.  This is to know things 
as either ready-to-hand or, in a more reified sense, as present-at-hand.  Thus, the way in which 
Dasein exists – its projects, aspirations and motivations – are prior to knowledge of these entities.  
This, of course, loosely corresponds to Sartre’s being-in-itself, or rather being-in-itselfs.10  (2) 
Dasein is with-others in a relationship of solicitude: we share a world with other consciousnesses 
who also exist as projects, structuring the world as a matrix for-themselves.  This loosely 
corresponds to Sartre’s being-for-others, but Sartre is – in Being and Nothingness – pessimistic 
about the possibility of authentic recognition by others and replaces Heidegger’s picture with a 
more antagonistic one, hence solicitude is substituted by shame.  (3) Finally, Dasein cares about 
itself.  It is immediately related to itself as that which cares who it is, what it does, and who it 
becomes.  This is the immediate way in which one can understand Sartre’s being-for-itself and 
again his emotional characterisation is more prosaic: anguish.11 
 
Of these three modes of consciousness, of knowing, the two which most closely map on to 
Sartre’s account are concern and care.  Heidegger says that it is pertinent and useful to apply the 
verb ‘to be’ to being-in-itself and the verb ‘to exist’ to being-for-itself, since the former answers the 
question ‘What is it?’ and the latter answers the question ‘Who is it?’12  Common to both is Dasein, 
  
without Dasein there would be no knowing, yet knowing in each case is a different type of 
behaviour.  One commits an ontological error, for Heidegger, when one attempts to know 
consciousness as a ‘what’ rather than a ‘who’.13  Cartesianism commits this error as does any 
account of human nature given in terms apt to a ‘what’ rather than a ‘who’, that is attempts to 
describe the human subject in terms of properties or as a thing present-at-hand with a fixed, eternal 
essence. 
 
Who, then, is Dasein?  Dasein is that which endures through the fleeting moments of 
consciousness in order to synthesise it and when we wish to characterise this synthesis it amounts to 
nothing more than a totalised system of moments of consciousness.  It is self-determination as a 
structure of existence: I exist as my possibilities, or as Heidegger characterises it: ‘I myself am 
mine.’ (BT ¶13)  Whereas, entities are determined from without by the projection of Dasein, Dasein 
projects itself.  The structure of the pre-reflective consciousness makes itself an object but can never 
grasp itself. (BT ¶25)  This entails that it is impossible to understand it as an object or as an essence 
(a what), one has to comprehend it as an existence, as a way of being (a who).  Sartre appropriates 
Heidegger’s insights in his presentation of being-for-itself, which then becomes his equivalent for 
the Kantian unity of apperception.  There has to exist an a priori unity of consciousness otherwise 
this particular moment of consciousness would be impossible and this a priori unity makes possible 
the empirical, synthetic unity which is me in the world. (BN 103)  The original project is the attempt 
by self-consciousness on the part of itself to make itself identical with its unifying process which is 
impossible, but necessary since it is its essential structure: 
There is an indivisible, indissoluble being – definitely not a substance supporting its 
qualities like particles of being, but a being which is existence through and through…  
This is what Heidegger expressed very well when he wrote (though speaking of Dasein, 
not of consciousness): ‘The ‘how’ (essentia) of this being, so far as it is possible to 
speak of it generally, must be conceived in terms of its existence (existentia).’  This 
  
means that consciousness is not produced as a particular instance of an abstract 
possibility but that in rising to the center of being, it creates and supports its essence – 
that is, the synthetic order of its possibilities. (BN xxxi)14 
 
Warnock understands Sartre’s for-itself as an essence like the Cartesian cogito, when it should 
most properly be understood as an existence.  She commits an ontological error when she assumes 
that the original project is an account of human nature as a ‘what’.  If the human being is a ‘what’, a 
thing present-at-hand, then one can apply the category of causality to it and the paradox of freedom 
arises.  However, Sartre is describing the ‘who’, the fundamental way in which human-being exists 
in the world.  In other words, the metaphysical account of the for-itself is being applied to the 
situation.  Warnock’s reading is dependent on the account of The Transcendence of the Ego and the 
first third of Being and Nothingness being extrapolated into a social situation, whereas Sartre is 
offering an account of how such a metaphysical entity exists in a social situation.  He is moving his 
description from the abstract level to the concrete level.   
 
The supposed tension in Sartre’s text between a universal account of human nature and his 
account of uncaused freedom rests on this ontological error.  It is to describe the subject in terms of 
a thing when Sartre repeatedly asserts that it is nothing.  The original project needs to be understood 
as a fuller elaboration of self-consciousness’s knowledge of itself.  Things are, that is, have, 
essences: a table is x, y, z.  Self-consciousness exists, that is, is free.  How do I know myself as 
freedom?  I know I am in anguish, that this anguish reveals that I want to negate my possibilities 
and become a thing which is free.  The original project is an elaboration of who we are and a 
description of the way we know ourselves and deal with our freedom.  Freedom is, after all, the 
futile pursuit of essence, of a negation trying to negate itself. 
 
  
To describe Sartre as a libertarian is misleading because the spontaneous nature of 
consciousness is not the essence of freedom, but the pre-condition of choice.  The freedom of 
consciousness is indeterminism and this indeterminism guarantees the notion of choice.15  In order 
for choice to be meaningful, this freedom has to be elaborated more fully as self-determination or 
the idea of personal freedom: ‘Thus from its first arising, consciousness by the pure nihilating 
movement of reflection makes itself personal; for what confers personal existence on a being is not 
the possession of an Ego – which is only the sign of a personality – but it is the fact that the being 
exists for itself as presence to itself.’ (BN 103; see also EH 29)  I am free when I am the one who 
chooses the content of my will, when I act on my volitions and not those imposed on me from 
without.  The original project cannot be understood in terms of freedom if this means only 
uncaused, but it is a good characterisation of the human condition if freedom as self-determination 
is a fundamental structure of the self, especially if the one who exists, exists in an absurd universe.  
Each of my acts fills me with being for which I am responsible, yet this ‘me’ can always be 
negated, always be overcome and ‘I’, too, am responsible for this fact.  Sartre’s conception of self-
determination is unique and original because it embodies the ‘necessity of contingency’: it is 
necessary that I determine myself but any determination is contingent since it has no ultimate 
meaning. (BN 327)  My being refers only to me and this is the impossible burden of responsibility 
that gives rise to anguish. 
 
Sartre’s account of the original project is not exactly an account of human nature as 
Warnock supposes, it is a characterisation of the human condition, of being human.  To read the 
original project as having a causal relationship with the particular acts of the individual is to apply a 
category which is mistaken.  Acts are not determined, things present-at-hand are determined (this is, 
at least, one of their possible ways to be) whereas acts are an expression of being-for-itself, they are 
self-determined.   
  
§4| Whose reading? 
 
Given the length and style of Being and Nothingness, it would be possible to identify 
passages which supported one or other of the readings elaborated above.  It is, therefore, more 
pertinent to point to general ways in which the Heideggerean reading might offer a better 
understanding of Sartre’s philosophical canon.  I shall do this in two ways: first, by demonstrating 
that the paradox of freedom and the supposed tension within Being and Nothingness is resolved 
without ceding either the notion of consciousness as spontaneity or the fundamental structure of the 
project. (§§4.1 and 4.2) Second, I shall question Warnock’s explicit accusation that the sociological 
concepts of Sartre’s later works do not grow out of, but rather negate, his earlier psychological 
concepts. (§5) 
§4.1| Warnock’s charge of determinism 
 
Sartre’s extreme libertarianism committed him to describing consciousness as uncaused 
spontaneity, but to describe an act as ‘mine’ means nothing unless there exists ‘me’ which can be 
identified as the cause of that act.  Therefore, in order to justify his own account of anguish and 
responsibility, Sartre offered a universal account of being human which operates by creating a unity 
of self.  Acts are not gratuitous but are to be understood in terms of an ongoing project to be in-
itself-for-itself.  This clearly brings in the second sense of freedom as self-determination: ‘Freedom 
is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human-reality 
to make itself instead of to be.’ (BN 440; see also 23, 34-5)  Sartre then sets himself the task of 
applying his account of the human condition to particular cases and it is in doing this that he sees 
the possibility of an existentialist psycho-analysis.  This is supposedly where Warnock’s criticism 
bites deepest: 
Of course, it may truly be said that absolutely any method of analysis, if it is designed to 
explain human behaviour in terms other than superficial or common-sense terms, must 
do so in the light of some general theory.  This is what such an explanation consists in.  
  
And there cannot be a general theory of human nature which does not commit its holder 
to some general views about how human beings necessarily behave.  And so from the 
very outset Sartre, as well as Freud and any one else who undertakes the task of 
analysis, is committed to a certain degree of determinism. (PS 126-7) 
Acts, according to Warnock, cannot be absolutely free because they are caused by the general 
human desire to be in-itself-for-itself.  However, her reading only works if the ‘human’ is rather 
than exists, which is to say, the human is a thing like a chair or a bottle with properties and/or 
tendencies.  Only because this is to think of a human in terms of what Heidegger calls a thing 
present-at-hand is it possible to apply those categories (such as causality) which one applies to 
chairs, bottles, et cetera. 
 
If it is true that Sartre is proposing a description of the human as a thing, then his proposal is 
useless since it serves little or no use as an explanatory theory.  Warnock is aware of this, citing it as 
a reason why Freud’s account of analysis is more satisfying, since his theory can explain actions 
whereas Sartrean analysis cannot.  Any general theory needs to be able to make predictions which 
either support or falsify the theory.  Freudian analysis can ideally investigate the particular details of 
an individual’s life (the initial conditions), add in some general desires from its account of human 
nature (universal laws) and generate a range of predictions.  It is obviously far more complicated 
than this ideal presentation, but it is possible.  The Sartrean analyst can only predict that freedom 
will be expressed in a general project to be in-itself-for-itself; that is, he predicts nothing.16 
 
Sartre was no fool.  Warnock’s charge of determinism just does not hold water because if 
one takes Sartre’s account of human nature as an explanatory theory, it is useless.  The general 
theory of the in-itself-for-itself has to be serving an alternative role in Sartre’s complete picture.  
Warnock’s challenge only applies if one assumes consciousness is a being present-at-hand, a thing 
with properties and tendencies, but that is the domain of being-in-itself and not for-itself.  Sartre 
  
begins Being and Nothingness by resisting epistemological primacy: one cannot know anything 
about consciousness without being it.  In other words, one’s existence precedes essence since one 
exists as the possibility to transcend the given and posit oneself as what is not  Sartre is, on one 
level, a libertarian because consciousness is uncaused spontaneity and it is this rupture with 
determinism which makes room for a meaningful account of personal freedom.  Yet, this 
metaphysical freedom is the most basic description of the phenomenon and not Sartrean freedom 
per se as Warnock seems to suggest.  Spontaneous consciousness is the conditional possibility of 
self-determination which is the proper characterisation of the human condition. 
 
Therefore, the original project described in Being and Nothingness is not a general theory of 
human behaviour, it is a description of human existence.  Given that self-conscious beings exist as 
freedom, how is an a priori unity of identity which grounds the synthetic unity of the person 
possible?  One, through self-determination: for consciousness to be self-consciousness it must exist 
freely through the moments of consciousness.  Two, the existence of other consciousnesses is an 
immediate structure of my being (self-consciousness is immediately aware of its being-for-others 
or, again, it would be only consciousness without identity) and, as such, I structure ‘me’ as an 
object for the evaluation of the other.  Three, self-consciousness then desires to be a unity open to 
evaluation, my a priori identity is structured as the attempt to create a synthetic unity (the project).  
The purpose of the second half of Being and Nothingness is, then, an attempt to answer this 
question: given this universal condition of being human, how are we to understand this particular, 
synthetic totality (and here one could substitute a proper name: Pierre, Laura)?  Sartre is concerned 
in Being and Nothingness to descend from the level of abstraction to concreteness: to show the 
relationship between self-consciousness as it exists for-itself as isolated, metaphysical freedom and 
self-consciousness as it exists in the world.  The original project characterises the way in which 
self-consciousness exists in the world and not, as Warnock supposes, a way in which we are (as, 
say, the table is brown or a lion is dangerous). 
  
§4.2| The three forms of bad faith 
 
Bad faith is a possible way in which the for-itself can exist.  It is an attempt to deny the 
contingency of actions due to some source of meaning prior to choice.  The for-itself denies 
responsibility for who it is and what it has made of itself.  In Being and Nothingness, bad faith takes 
three forms: (1) the belief that I am determined by my facticity: the agent assumes that essential, 
fixed properties limit his possibilities and explain his actions.  (2) The belief that I exist most 
authentically as transcendence, that no matter what you describe as ‘me’, I can negate it.  I can 
negate all my facticity, because I am free.  This form of bad faith implicitly denies my being-for-
others which is an essential structure of freedom; that is, existing in the world.  (3) Finally, the 
‘spirit of seriousness’ or binding oneself to a purpose: I am a communist, I am a Christian and my 
role dictates certain obligations which derive from something external to me.  This is described as 
another way to try and fulfil my project without the anguish of choosing for myself because, as a 
part of a general movement, my choices are limited by the dictates of that movement. 
 
It is commonly supposed that Sartre’s authentic self-consciousness and the self-
consciousness of bad faith map snugly on to Heidegger’s own authentic and inauthentic Dasein.  
Dasein, like Sartre’s for-itself, has always made some choice about being the way it is (it is 
responsible for its own facticity) and this choice is authentic when it chooses for itself and 
inauthentic when it is chosen for. (BT ¶¶9, 27 and 38)  Yet, if Sartre’s own distinction is supposed 
to map neatly on this, a problem immediately arises.  The first form of bad faith, where I consider 
myself a thing with properties, is not a case of inauthenticity in Heidegger’s sense.  Rather, it is to 
commit an ontological error: one is using categories and descriptions which are simply not apt and 
any conclusion which is generated will be inapplicable.  Sartre, though, is more astute than 
Heidegger – perhaps because Being and Nothingness is anthropology and not a preparatory work 
for ontology – because he recognises that this ontological error is a way in which self-consciousness 
often exists.  Warnock accuses Sartre of this very error in his description of the original project, but 
  
if the human did not exist as a project, then bad faith would not be possible.  Bad faith is to think of 
oneself as a thing with properties and it would be strange if Sartre contradicted himself so 
brazenly.17 
 
Similarly, the second form of bad faith is puzzling if it is considered with Heidegger’s 
distinction in mind.  It is also an ontological error because it is to deny who one is – an existence in 
the world – and to misdescribe human being.  If Sartre is solely a libertarian, what sense is one 
supposed to make of the idea of revelling in transcendence as bad faith, when this is the very 
freedom which Warnock celebrates?  Self-determination is the acceptance of my own facticity and 
the situation within which I find myself in order to work it over, to make it truly mine.  (BN 489; 
SM 12-13) 
 
The final form of bad faith does neatly map on to Heidegger’s distinction and Sartre makes 
it explicitly moral: one ought not to live in bad faith, one ought to be authentic.  His aim in Being 
and Nothingness is not to tell us how to live, though.  Bad faith is only possible for a self-
determining being and it allows us to discover those structures which constitute a self-determining 
being.  However, within an absurd universe devoid of meaning and value, how is it possible to be 
authentic?  The opposite of bad faith is neither good faith nor sincerity, these are equally erroneous 
attitudes.  The opposite is, and here one hears an echo of Heidegger, authenticity. (BN 70fn)  
However, there is little hope of an ethics of authenticity in Being and Nothingness because Sartre 
sees social being as wholly alienated, or any political project or collective movement as 
impossible.18  Yet, these are the very themes of the later works when he is attempting to extrapolate 
the psychological concepts into the sphere of sociology.   
 
In the bridge between Being and Nothingness and the Critique, Sartre defines the spirit of 
seriousness in these words: ‘The spirit of seriousness is voluntary alienation, that is, submission to 
  
an abstraction that justifies one: the thought that man is the inessential and the abstract the 
essential.’ (NE 60) The alienation is voluntary, that is free in the sense of self-determined, and 
therefore authentic.  Where the spirit of seriousness fails is in the rejection of the particular and the 
individual in favour of the duties of some impersonal, abstract entity.  This is the very premise 
which Sartre will begin the Critique from, that is the need to marry existentialist subjectivism with 
Marxist historicism.  Being and Nothingness is not a failure, it is incomplete as Sartre himself 
acknowledges: ‘… what is impossible at the level of the For-itself and the Project (the ontological 
organisation of a We) becomes real on the anthropological level of some common work.’ (NE 130)  
The incomplete nature of Being and Nothingness resides in its consideration of an isolated 
individual existing in the world, but the third form of bad faith points explicitly towards the need 
for a sociological and political understanding of man.  Ignoring the continuity between the early 
psychological concepts and the later sociological ones only serves to exaggerate Warnock’s 
supposed contradiction between the idea of freedom and the project. 
§5| Is there continuity or rupture in Sartre’s thought? 
 
By placing a privilege on Sartre’s early works and especially on the metaphysical freedom 
of consciousness, Warnock, firstly, sees an inconsistency in Sartre’s thought between his supposed 
indeterminism and a deterministic account of human nature; and, secondly, produces a contradiction 
between her interpretation of freedom and Sartre’s own discussion of bad faith.  However, if one 
understands personal freedom as self-determination, a freedom made possible by the metaphysical 
reality of a spontaneous consciousness but not identical to it, then these two problems dissipate.  
This advantage in itself is arguably reason enough to accept this interpretation, but there is another 
aspect to it which affects our understanding of the earlier and the later Sartre.  Warnock treats them 
as two entities diametrically opposed to one another, and she is not the only one.19  However, the 
supposed rupture between pre and post Being and Nothingness rests on the very idea of freedom 
  
against which I have sought to argue.  By ignoring the idea of freedom as self-determination and 
any serious engagement with the later philosophical works, this reading becomes self-perpetuating. 
 
Uncaused spontaneity, or consciousness, is not identical with personal freedom (as Warnock 
supposes), but is a precondition of it.  This reading allows one to climb from a metaphysical 
account of freedom as indeterminism to an anthropological account of freedom as self-
determination.  If this is the case, then this anthropological account of freedom must similarly be a 
pre-condition of a sociological account of freedom found in the pages of The Critique of Dialectical 
Freedom.  It would be unreasonable to adequately interrogate this hypothesis without beginning a 
new article, but I merely wish to show that the concepts in play in Sartre’s political and sociological 
works are both dependent on and an extrapolation of freedom as self-determination in the same way 
that that idea is both dependent on and an extrapolation of an account of metaphysical 
indeterminism.   
 
Being and Nothingness does not fulfil the task of offering a complete set of methodological 
tools for comprehending the synthetic totality of the person – Sartre’s attempt at a fundamental 
psycho-analytic theory is incomplete and he only hints at the possibility of an ethics.  This 
deficiency is not, however, a failure because a full description of the person necessarily requires a 
sociology and an ethics.  In The Transcendence of the Ego and the beginning of Being and 
Nothingness, freedom is described from the metaphysical point of view.  Sartre is concerned with 
revealing the structures of freedom in isolation, thus freedom is primarily understood as uncaused 
spontaneity since this is consistent with the phenomenological approach adopted.  This description 
is a conditional possibility for a person to exist as a project and the idea of freedom as self-
determination begins to take hold in parts 3 and 4 of Being and Nothingness where Sartre turns his 
analysis to the significance of the situation and the subject’s facticity.  Later, in the Critique, history 
too will play a part. 
  
 
The progressive-regressive method is Sartre’s first attempt to truly complete his account of 
being human.  It remains a theory of human nature based upon the free transcendence of one’s 
situation (progressive), yet simultaneously realises that a particular project has to be understood as 
the negation of a particular situation, facticity or history.  As freedom is essentially the for-itself 
existing as being-for-others, then the way in which it will be free depends on its particular others 
and not some abstract, universal other.  With the progressive-regressive method, Sartre is trying to 
make his general account of being human applicable to the particular case: ‘The project has a 
meaning, it is not the simple negativity of flight; by it a man aims at the production of himself in the 
world as a certain objective totality.’ (SM 147; see also SM 150-1)  Only within a social context, 
that is the actual structures of being-for-others, can freedom be meaningful rather than absurd.  
(CDR 334) 
 
The progressive-regressive method can only be applicable to persons if the more fundamental 
description of human existence is projection.  Similarly, freedom within social reality is to be 
understood as praxis: 
… the ‘transcendence-immanence’ of its members creates the possibility of the group as 
common action.  Pure immanence, indeed, would eliminate the practical organism in 
favour of a hyper-organism.  Or, quite simply, if it were possible for everyone to effect 
his own integration, every action, in so far as it was common, would lose any possibility 
of or reason for positing itself as a regulatory action and the group would no longer 
conceive itself in its praxis through innumerable refractions of the same operation.  In 
other words, the action would be blind, or would become inertia.  Pure transcendence, 
however, would shatter the practical community into molecules related only by bonds of 
exteriority and no one would recognise himself in the action or signal of some atomised 
individual. (CDR 409) 
  
This is the possibility of an ethics, the way in which one can commit oneself to a meaning without 
falling into the spirit of seriousness.  Sartre sets out the conditions of social freedom: it is not 
wholly immanent, for that would be Humean: to reason to one’s ends, but not to choose one’s ends 
(they would be chosen by the group).  Neither is it wholly transcendental (metaphysical freedom), 
for that would be ineffectual: to negate everything, is to negate even possibility.  These mirror the 
first two forms of bad faith.  Yet, social freedom is precarious unlike absolute freedom, it must ward 
off the ever present possibility of inertia, that is becoming the third form of bad faith, viz. the spirit 
of seriousness (or seriality).  In fact, the bad faith of the Critique maps neatly on to the 
authentic/inauthentic distinction that was described earlier: when historical necessity is able to 
furnish a complete explanation it does so through an ontological error in that the self is assumed to 
be substance and this myth is perpetuated by other freedoms (oppressing classes, the system 
solidified, etc.): freedom is still the only limit to my freedom.  The agent is in bad faith because he 
has not chosen himself, he is not his own product.  It is this very contradiction between how I exist 
(praxis) and what I am (the practico-inert) which fuels the movement towards the future.  The 
constant worry in the Critique that authentic praxis may become the pratico-inert arises from 
Sartre’s assertion that for freedom to be meaningful it has to occur in objective or historical 
structures.  Freedom as self-determination remains at the heart of Sartre’s enterprise. (CDR 339-
431) 
 
Without his psychological concepts, the basis of praxis as a sociological theory of action 
would be woefully incomplete.  More than any other, the idea of freedom as self-determination is 
crucial in that the characterisation of praxis remains that I, as individual, am responsible for what I 
(and what we) make of myself (ourselves): it is because man can negate what is, because he is free 
to choose himself, that the negative conception of the world ‘it is impossible that there is no better 
society or way of things’ provides the motor of change as an implicit ‘the world ought to be thus’ in 
the future. (CDR 330)  The idea of freedom as self-determination not only solves certain 
  
inconsistencies which arise if one shares Warnock’s belief that Sartre is a libertarian, it also 
dissolves the idea that he undergoes a radical conversion from existentialism to Marxism.  If one 
understands freedom as self-determination, it is possible to see how the sociological concepts of 
Sartre’s later texts are dependent upon his existentialist origins, even if such a claim requires much 
more argument in order to be fully convincing. 
  
Notes: 
A version of this paper was delivered at the 10th annual conference for the UK Society for Sartrean 
Studies.  I am grateful for the many helpful questions and comments from that meeting and also to 
the anonymous referee for this journal who helped to refine and clarify this paper. 
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